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Abstract
We consider the Maximum Vectors problem in a
strategic setting. In the classical setting this prob-
lem consists, given a set of k-dimensional vectors,
in computing the set of all nondominated vectors.
Recall that a vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vk) is said
to be nondominated if there does not exist another
vector v∗ = (v
1
∗ , v
2
∗ , . . . , v
k
∗ ) such that v
l ≤ vl∗ for
1 ≤ l ≤ k, with at least one strict inequality among
the k inequalities. This problem is strongly related
to other known problems such as the Pareto curve
computation in multiobjective optimization. In a
strategic setting each vector is owned by a selfish
agent which can misreport her values in order to be-
come nondominated by other vectors. Our work ex-
plores under which conditions it is possible to in-
centivize agents to report their true values using the
algorithmic mechanism design framework. We pro-
vide both impossibility results along with positive
ones, according to various assumptions.
1 Introduction
A great variety of algorithms and methods have been designed
for various optimization problems. In classic Combinatorial
Optimization, the algorithm knows the complete input of the
problem, and its goal is to produce an optimal or near optimal
solution. However, in many modern applications the input of
the problem is spread among a set of selfish agents, where ea-
chone owns a different part of the input as private knowledge.
Hence, every agent is capable to manipulate the algorithm by
miss-reporting its part of the input in order to maximize its
personal payoff. In their seminal paper Nisan and Ronen [25]
were the first to study the impact of the “strategic” behavior
of the agents on the difficulty of an optimization problem.
Since then Algorithmic Mechanism Design studies optimiza-
tion problems in presence of selfish agents with private knowl-
edge of the input and potentially conflicting individual objec-
tive functions. The goal is to know whether it is possible to
propose a truthful (or incentive compatible) mechanism, i.e.,
an algorithm solving the optimization problem together with
a set of incentives/payments for the agents motivating them to
report honestly their part of the input.
As an illustrating example, consider the problem of finding
the maximum of a set of values v1, v2, . . . , vn. In the clas-
sic setting, computing the maximum value is trivial. Let us
consider now the case when the inputs are strategic. It means
that each of the n selfish agents i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has a private
value vi (not known to the algorithm) for being selected (as the
∗Contact Author
maximum), and may report any value bi. If the agents know
that the maximum value will be computed using the classic
algorithm: maxi bi, then each agent will have an incentive to
cheat by declaring+∞ instead of her true value.
In such a strategic setting, we need a mechanism that is ca-
pable to give incentive to the agents to report eachone their
true value. For doing that we may use Vickrey’s (also known
as second-price) mechanism [32]. In this setting, the maxi-
mummaxi bi is still computed, but the agent i
∗=arg max bi is
charged the second highest reported value p∗ := maxj 6=i∗ bj .
Her utility is therefore vi∗ − p∗. It can be shown that in such
a setting each agent i will have an incentive to report bi = vi,
and henceforth this mechanism is able to compute the maxi-
mum value in this strategic environment [12].
In this paper, we consider the problem of maximum vectors,
i.e., the problem of finding the maxima of a set of vectors in
a strategic environment. The classic problem of computing
the maxima of a set of vectors can be stated as follows: we
are given a set V of n k-dimensional vectors v1, v2, . . . , vn
with vi = (v
1
i , v
2
i , . . . , v
k
i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Given two
vectors vi = (v
1
i , v
2
i , . . . , v
k
i ) and vj = (v
1
j , v
2
j , . . . , v
k
j ), we
say that vi is dominated by vj if v
l
i ≤ v
l
j for 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
with at least one strict inequality among the k inequalities.
The problem consists in computingMAX(V ), i.e. the set of
all nondominated vectors among the n given vectors. This
problem is related to other known problems as the Pareto
curve computation in multiobjective optimization [16; 27;
31], the skyline problem in databases [20; 26], or the contour
problem [23]. In a “strategic” setting the problem is as fol-
lows: there are n selfish agents 1, 2, . . . , n and the value of
agent i is described by a vector vi = (v
1
i , v
2
i , . . . , v
k
i ) for be-
ing selected1. The vector vi is a private information known
only by agent i. Computing the set of nondominated vectors
by using one of the classic algorithms gives incentive to the
agents to cheat by declaring+∞ in all the coordinates of their
vectors instead of their true values per coordinate. Our work
explores under which conditions it is possible to incentivize
agents to report their true values. In order to precisely an-
swer this question, it is useful to distinguish two cases. In the
strongest case, the mechanism is able to enforce truthtelling
for each agent regardless of the reports of the others (truth-
fulness). In the second case, the mechanism is able to enforce
truthtelling for each agent assuming that the others report their
true values (equilibria truthfulness).
Previous works The Artificial Intelligence (AI) community
is faced with many real-world problems involving multiple,
conflicting and noncommensurate objectives in path planning
[15; 21; 29], game search [11], preference-based configuration
1An agent is selected if its bid belongs to the set of nondominated
vectors.
[3], ... Modeling such problems using a single scalar-valued
criterion may be problematic (see for instance [33]) and hence
multiobjective approaches have been studied in the AI litera-
ture [18; 22]. Some multiobjective problems have been con-
sidered in the mechanism design framework. However, these
works apply a budget approach where instead of computing
the set of all Pareto solutions (or an approximation of this set),
they consider that among the different criteria, one is the main
criterion to be optimizedwhile the others are modeled via bud-
get constraints [7; 17].
Another family of related works concern auction theory.
In the classical setting, the item as well as the valuation
of the bidders are characterized by a scalar representing the
price/value of the item. However, in many situations an item
is characterized, besides of its price, by quality measures, de-
livery times, technical specifications etc. In such cases, the
valuation of the bidders for the item are vectors. Auctions
where the item to sell or buy are characterized by a vector
are known as multi-attribute auctions [1; 2; 4; 5; 6; 8; 9; 13;
14]. In most of these works, a scoring rule is used for combin-
ing the values of the different attributes in order to determine
the winner of the auction.
Our contributionWe first show that neither truthfulness nor
equilibria truthfulness are achievable. However, if one as-
sumes that the agents have distinct values in each of the di-
mensions, we show that it is possible to design an equilibria
truthful mechanism for theMaximumVector problem. We also
show that the payments that our algorithm computes are the
only payments that give this guarantee. In order to go beyond
the negative result concerning ties in the valuations of agents,
we show that it is possible to get an equilibria truthful mech-
anism for the Weakly Maximum Vector problem in which one
looks for weakly nondominated vectors instead of nondomi-
nated ones [16].
2 Problem definition
The following definition and notations will be useful in the
sequel of the paper.
Definition 1. Given two vectors x, y ∈ Rk+ we say that:
• x weakly dominates y, denoted by x  y, iff xj ≥ yj for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , k};
• x dominates y, denoted by x ≻ y, iff x  y and xj > yj
holds for at least one coordinate j ∈ {1, . . . , k};
• x strongly dominates y, denoted by x ≫ y, iff xj > yj
holds for all coordinates j ∈ {1, . . . , k};
• x and y are incomparable, denoted by x ∼ y, iff there
exist two coordinates, say j and j′, such that xj < yj
and xj
′
> yj
′
.
We denote by Rk+ (resp. R
k
∗+) the set of vectors v ∈ R
k
such that v ≻ ~0 (resp. v ≫ ~0), with ~0 := (0, . . . , 0) the zero
vector.
Given a set F ⊂ Rk+, as stated before, we denote
by MAX(F ) the subset of all nondominated vectors, i.e.
MAX(F ) := {v ∈ F : 6 ∃v∗ ∈ F, v∗ ≻ v}. Such a set is com-
posed of pairwise incomparable vectors. In a similar way, we
will denote byMIN(F ) the set {v ∈ F : 6 ∃v∗ ∈ F, v ≻ v∗}.
We will also consider the subset of all weakly nondominated
vectors, i.e. WMAX(F ) := {v ∈ F : 6 ∃v∗ ∈ F, v∗ ≫ v}.
The Maximum Vector problem has been studied in the clas-
sical framework, and the following proposition is known:
Proposition 1. (from [19]) The set MAX(F ) can be com-
puted in O(|F | log |F |) time for k = 2, 3 and at most
O(|F |(log |F |)k−2) for k ≥ 4.
Following the mechanism design framework [24], we aim
to design a mechanism, that we call Pareto mechanism, such
that no agent has an incentive to misreport its vector in or-
der to increase her utility. The set of agents is denoted by
N . Each agent i has a private vector vi = (v
1
i , v
2
i , . . . , v
k
i )
representing the agent valuations on k numerical criteria for
being selected. In the following, we consider that k is a fixed
constant. We denote by V the set of private vectors. Each
agent i reports a vector (a bid) bi = (b
1
i , b
2
i , . . . , b
k
i ). We de-
note by B the set of all reported vectors. Based on the set
of reported vectors, the mechanism computes for each agent i
a vector-payment pi = (p
1
i , p
2
i , . . . , p
k
i ). For each agent i, if
bi belongs to MAX(B) she has to pay pi and so her utility
is ui := vi − pi, while if bi does not belong to MAX(B)
her utility is ui = ~0 (zero vector). Since no agent has an in-
centive to misreport her vector in order to increase her utility,
we will be able to correctly computeMAX(V ) by computing
MAX(B) since we will haveMAX(B) = MAX(V ).
If we considerWMAX instead ofMAX we use the term
of a weakly Pareto mechanism.
3 Preliminaries
The Pareto mechanism we want to design must satisfy several
properties.
Definition 2 (multiobjective individual rationality). A Pareto
mechanism satisfies the multiobjective individual rationality
(MIR) constraint iff ui  ~0 for all agents i.
By the MIR constraint, it is always better for an agent to
participate in the mechanism (i.e. reports a vector) than not
participating. In the following we will always assume that the
mechanism satisfies the MIR constraint.
We want that the Pareto mechanism incentivize agents to
report their true values. This leads to the two following formal
definitions.
Definition 3 (multiobjective truthfulness). For any fixed set
of reported vectors bi′ , i
′ 6= i, let ui be agent i’s utility if she
reports bi = vi and let u
′
i denotes her utility if she reports
bi 6= vi (the reported vectors of all the other agents remaining
unchanged). A Pareto mechanism is said to be multiobjective
truthful iff ui  u′i or ui ∼ u
′
i for any agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4 (multiobjective equilibria truthfulness). As in the
previous definition, let ui be agent i’s utility if bi = vi and let
u′i denotes her utility if bi 6= vi. A Pareto mechanism is said
to be multiobjective equilibria truthful iff ui  u′i or ui ∼ u
′
i
for any agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, assuming that bi′ = vi′ for all
i′ 6= i.
Honestly reporting her valuation is a dominant strategy for
any agent if the mechanism is truthful.
We will also need some additional definitions in the con-
text of multicriteria optimization, along with some technical
lemmas. The missing proofs can be found in the Appendix
Section. In the sequel, all sets S have a finite size.
Definition 5. Let S ⊂ Rk∗+ be a finite set of k-dimensional
vectors. We define the reference points2 of S, denoted by
2This set is known in multiobjective optimization as the set of
local upper bounds [10].
s1
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Figure 1: The reference points in dimension 2. One has S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4} and T (S) = {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}.
T (S), as the minimum subset ofRk+ such that for any v ∈ R
k
∗+
with v 6∈ MAX(S), one has v ∈ MAX(S ∪ {v}) iff
∃t ∈ T (S) such that v ≫ t.
Such a set can be easily computed in dimension 2. For
k = 2, an example is depicted in Figure 1. Let S ⊂ R2∗+. By
Proposition 1, we computeMAX(S) = {s1, . . . , sr}, where
the solutions si, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, are pairwise incomparable. With-
out loss of generality we assume that s11 < s
1
2 < . . . < s
1
r and
s21 > s
2
2 > . . . > s
2
r. Then one has T (S) = {t1, . . . tr+1}
with t1 = (0, s
2
1), tr+1 = (s
1
r , 0) and tl = (s
1
l−1, s
2
l ) for
2 ≤ l ≤ r. The overall complexity to compute T (S) is there-
fore O(|S| log |S|) in dimension 2.
The existence and uniqueness of such a set for any dimen-
sion follows from Proposition 2. Let DjS := {0} ∪ {s
j : s ∈
S} for j = 1, . . . , k, and ΩS := D1S ×D
2
S × · · · ×D
k
S .
Proposition 2. For any finite set S ⊂ Rk∗+, one has T (S) =
MIN({t ∈ ΩS : ∀s ∈ S, s 6≫ t}).
Notice that |ΩS | ≤ (|S| + 1)k and by using Proposi-
tion 1 we obtain that for any S ⊂ Rk∗+ its set of reference
points T (S) can be computed in polynomial time with
respect to |S| (k is assumed to be a constant). For exam-
ple, with k = 3 and S = {(2, 2, 2), (1, 3, 3), (3, 1, 1)},
using Proposition 2 one obtains: T (S) =
{(3, 0, 0), (2, 1, 0), (2, 0, 1), (1, 2, 0), (1, 0, 2), (0, 3, 0), (0, 0, 3)}.
4 Impossibility results
Because of the following Proposition, achieving an equilibria
truthful Pareto mechanism is the best we can hope for.
Proposition 3. A Pareto mechanism cannot be truthful.
Proof. Let us consider an instance in two dimensions, with
three agents reporting b1 = (3, 1), b2 = (1, 3) and b3 = (2, 2).
Then b3 ∈ MAX(B), and agent 3 is charged some payment
p3  (2, 2) by the MIR assumption. Let us define the follow-
ing region of paymentsR = ([1, 2]× [1, 2])\{(1, α)∪(α, 1)}
for 1 ≤ α ≤ 2, depicted in Figure 2. We claim that we
can not have p3 ∈ R. Indeed if it was the case, then if
v3 = (2, 2) agent 3’s interest would be to lie and report
b3 = ((1+p
1
3)/2, (1+p
2
3)/2). She would still be inMAX(B)
and get charged p′3  b3 ≺ p3.
Now, since p3  (2, 2) and p3 6∈ R it means that either
p3  (1, 2) (case 1) or p3  (2, 1) (case 2). In the first case,
if v3 = (1, 2.5) then agent 3’s interest would be to lie and
b1
b2
b3
v3
v3
case 1
case 2
1 2 3
1
2
3
Figure 2: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 3.
report b3 = (2, 2). She would belong to MAX(B) and her
utility would be (1, 2.5)− p3 ≻ (0, 0), whereas if she reports
b3 = v3 she would not belong to MAX(B) and therefore
gets a utility (0, 0). In the second case, in a similar way if
v3 = (2.5, 1) then agent 3’s interest would be to lie and report
b3 = (2, 2).
Definition 6. An instance satisfies the DV property (distinct
values) if for every couple of distinct agents i, i′ ∈ N , and
every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, vji 6= v
j
i′ holds.
Let us motivate the introduction of this property.
Proposition 4. Without the DV property, a Pareto mechanism
cannot be equilibria-truthful.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one for Proposition 3.
We only need to assume that agents 1 and 2 are reporting their
true vectors, i.e. b1 = v1 = (3, 1) and b2 = v2 = (1, 3), and
notice that the DV assumption does not hold in cases 1 and
2.
5 A Pareto mechanism for the Maximum
Vector problem
We are going to present a Pareto mechanism, denoted byM,
which satisfies the MIR constraint and which is equilibria-
truthful under the hypothesis DV. The mechanism is described
in Algorithm 1. In the initial step, we remove all identical vec-
tors. This means that if there is a set of agents with the same
reported vector b, this vector is removed from the set B and
all such agents will not be considered anymore in the mecha-
nism. Notice that this case will not occur, since we are in the
context of a equilibria truthfulm mechanism and we have the
DV assumption. Not having two identical vectors is a formal
requirement used in the proof of Lemma 1. The mechanism
computes for all agents i such that bi ∈ MAX(B) a set of
possible payments, denoted by PAY (i), and can charge agent
i any payment from this set.
Lemma 1. For any agent i such that bi ∈MAX(B), one has
PAY (i) 6= ∅.
Algorithm 1 The Pareto mechanismM.
1: Remove all identical vectors and corresponding agents.
2: ComputeMAX(B).
3: For all bi ∈ MAX(B), set PAY (i) := {t ∈ T (B \
{bi}) | bi  t}, and choose any pi ∈ PAY (i).
4: For all bi /∈MAX(B), we set pi = ~0.
Proof. We need the following notations. Let DjB := {0} ∪
{bj : b ∈ B} for j = 1, . . . , k. Given a ∈ R∗+, let us denote
by decB,j(a) the quantitymax{x ∈ D
j
B : x < a}.
Let us consider a vector r = (decB,1(b
1
i ), . . . , decB,k(b
k
i )).
If there exists an agent z 6= i such that bz ≫ r then bz ≻ bi
(since no two reported vectors are identical), which is a contra-
diction with bi ∈ MAX(B). Therefore r ∈ {t ∈ ΩB\{bi} :
∀s ∈ B \ {bi}, s 6≫ t}. By definition of theMIN operator,
there exists w ∈ MIN({t ∈ ΩB\{bi} : ∀s ∈ B \ {bi}, s 6≫
t}) = T (B \ {bi}) such that w  r. Since r ≺ bi (by
construction), we get w ≺ bi. Therefore w ∈ PAY (i) and
PAY (i) 6= ∅.
Theorem 1. The Pareto mechanismM satisfies the MIR con-
straint.
Proof. Given an agent i such that bi 6∈ MAX(B) her utility
ui is the zero vector ~0 by definition. Now given an agent i
such that bi ∈ MAX(B), we have to prove that bi  pi
for all pi ∈ PAY (i). By Lemma 1, PAY (i) is nonempty,
and according to the mechanismM, PAY (i) contains vectors
dominated by bi, thus the property holds.
In what follows, we use the following standard notation in
game theory. Given a set of reported vectors B := {bj | j ∈
N}, we denote by (b−i, vi) the set in which each agent j ∈
N \ {i} reports bj , excepted the agent i which reports vi in-
stead, and we denote by (b−i, bi) the set in which each agent
j ∈ N reports bj including the agent i which reports bi.
Before proving Theorem 2 we need the following two lem-
mas:
Lemma 2. Let S ⊂ Rk∗+ be a finite set. Then, ∀t ∈ T (S) and
∀j ∈ {1, . . . k}, then tj = 0 or ∃s ∈ S such that tj = sj .
Lemma 3. Let S ⊂ Rk∗+ be a finite set. Then, T (S) is com-
posed of mutually noncomparable vectors, i.e. ∀t, t′ ∈ T (S),
one has t = t′ or t ∼ t′.
Theorem 2. The Pareto mechanismM is equilibria-truthful.
Proof. Let ui be agent i’s utility if bi = vi and let u
′
i denotes
her utility if bi 6= vi. We need to show that ui  u′i or ui ∼ u
′
i.
Recall that we always assume that bi ≫ ~0 and vi ≫ ~0.
We have two cases to consider. First, let assume that vi 6∈
MAX(b−i, vi). The utility ui of agent i is ~0. In that case,
agent i may have an incentive to report a vector bi 6= vi
such that bi ∈ MAX(b−i, bi). According to the mecha-
nism M, agent i will be charged some t ∈ T (B \ {bi}).
Since vi 6∈ MAX(b−i, vi) we get from Definition 5 with
S = B \ {bi} and v = vi that vi 6≫ t. From the DV (dis-
tinct values) hypothesis and Lemma 2 and using that vi ≫ ~0,
we can conclude that either vi ∼ t t or t ≫ vi. Indeed, if it
was not the case, then vi 6≫ t, vi 6∼ t t and t 6≫ vi implies
that ∃j such that vji = t
j and by Lemma 2 we know that either
b1
b2
b3
b4
bi
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
vi
vi
vi
(a) First Case - Here t can be either t2, t3 or
t4. The situation corresponding to the dashed
line for which one has neither vi ∼ t2 nor
t2 ≫ vi is not possible.
b1
b2
b3
b4
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
vi
bi bi
bi
(b) Second Case - The various possible pay-
ments according to the vector the agent i de-
clares are indicated with a dashed line.
Figure 3: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 2.
tj = 0 or ∃s ∈ B \{bi} such that tj = sj , meaning that either
vji = 0 or v
j
i = s
j with s the reported vector of a agent differ-
ent from i. But recall that we have assumed that vi ≫ ~0 and
moreover since the other agents report their true values and by
the DV hypothesis this is not possible. This case is illustrated
in Figure 3a. Therefore, the utility u′i = vi − t of agent i will
satisfy ~0 ∼ u′i or ~0≫ u
′
i.
Assume now that vi ∈ MAX(b−i, vi). According to the
mechanismM, if agent i declares her true value, she will be
charged some t such that t ∈ T (B \ {bi}). Her utility ui will
be vi − t. If agent i reports bi such that bi ∈ MAX(b−i, bi),
then she will be charged t′ for some t′ ∈ T (B \ {bi}) and her
utility u′i will be vi − t
′. Since by Lemma 3 one has t = t′ or
t ∼ t′, the utilitie will satisfy u′i = ui or u
′
i ∼ ui. This case
is illustrated in Figure 3b. Finally if agent i reports bi such
that bi 6∈ MAX(b−i, bi), her utility will be zero, i.e. u′i = ~0
whereas ui  ~0 according to Theorem 1.
We are now going to prove that the Pareto mechanism we
introduced is the unique way of achieving equilibria truthful-
ness.
Let π be a truthful payment function, i.e. given a set of re-
ported vectorsB, for any agent i, πi(B) is the amount charged
to the agent i, such that no agent has an incentive to declare
a false vector. Recall that by the MIR constraint, we assume
that
bi  πi(b−i, bi) for any vector bi. (1)
Lemma 4. For any two different reported vectors bi and b
′
i,
such that bi ∈MAX(b−i, bi) and b′i ∈MAX(b−i, b
′
i), either
πi(b−i, bi) ∼ πi(b−i, b′i) or πi(b−i, bi) = πi(b−i, b
′
i).
Proof. Let us assume that πi(b−i, b
′
i) ≻ πi(b−i, bi). Then if
vi = b
′
i, agent i would have an incentive to report bi instead of
her true value vi. The same line of reasoning shows that one
cannot have π(b−i, bi) ≻ π(b−i, b′i) neither.

We need additional lemmas.
Lemma 5. Let S ⊂ Rk∗+ be a finite set. Then, ∀s ∈
MAX(S), ∃t ∈ T (S) such that s ≻ t.
Lemma 6. Let x, y, z ∈ Rk+ be three k-dimensional vectors,
such that y ≻ x and y ∼ z. Then, x 6 z
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that x  z.
Since y ∼ z, one can assume without loss of generality that
y1 > z1 and y2 < z2. Since y ≻ x, one has y2 ≥ x2.
Therefore, z2 > x2, which is in contradiction with x  z.
Lemma 7. Let S ⊂ Rk+ be a set of k-dimensional vectors,
mutually non comparable, i.e. ∀s, s′ ∈ S, one has s ∼ s′. Let
p ∈ Rk+ such that s
∗ ≻ p, for some s∗ ∈ S. Then ∀s ∈ S,
s ≻ p or s ∼ p.
Proof. Let us consider any s ∈ S with s 6= s∗. We know that
s ∼ s∗, and by using Lemma 6 with x = p, y = s∗ and z = s,
we obtain that p 6 s, i.e. s≫ p or s ∼ p.
Lemma 8. Let S ⊂ Rk+ be a set of k-dimensional vectors,
and let p ∈ Rk+ such that ∀s ∈ S, p ∼ s. Then, there exist
δ ∈ Rk∗+ such that ∀s ∈ S, p+ δ ∼ s.
Proof. Let S = {s1, . . . , s|S|}. Since p ∼ s, ∀s ∈ S, it
means that ∀si ∈ S, ∃li, l′i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that s
li
i > p
li
and s
l′i
i < p
l′i . Let Ij = {i | li = j}. For all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let
εj = mini∈Ij (s
li
i − p
li) if Ij 6= ∅, and let εj be any positive
real number otherwise. Then it is easy to see that the vector
δ = (ε1/2, . . . , εk/2) satisfies the lemma. Indeed, observe
that εj > 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Now let us consider any sr ∈ S
with 1 ≤ r ≤ |S|. One has slrr > p
lr and s
l′r
r < pl
′
r . Therefore
s
l′r
r < pl
′
r + εl
′
r/2 = (p + δ)l
′
r . We are going to show that
slrr > (p + δ)
lr . One has r ∈ Ilr , hence εlr ≤ s
lr
r − p
lr , and
δlr = εlr/2 < s
lr
r −p
lr , which means that slrr > (p+δ)
lr .
Lemma 9. Let S ⊂ Rk+ a set of k-dimensional vectors, and
let p ∈ Rk+ such that one has ∀s ∈ S1, s ∼ p, and one
has ∀s ∈ S2, s ≻ p, with S1 and S2 a bipartition of S, i.e.
S1 ∪ S2 = S and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Then, there exist δ ∈ Rk∗+
such that ∀s ∈ S, s ∼ p+ δ or s ≻ p+ δ.
Proof. This result can be considered as a generalization of
Lemma 8 and the proof is quite similar. For the set S1 we
define ǫj as previously. For the set S2, we define ε
′j =
min{s∈S2 : sj−pj>0} s
j − pj if the set {s ∈ S2 : sj − pj > 0}
is not empty, otherwise ε′j is any positive value. Then it is
easy to see that the vector δ with δj = min{εj, ε′j}/2, for
1 ≤ j ≤ k satisfies the lemma. For example, let us consider
any s ∈ S2. Since s ≻ p, ∃l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, such that sl > pl.
Then sl ≥ pl + ε′l > pl + δl. It implies that s ∼ p + δ or
s ≻ p+ δ. If s ∈ S1 the proof is the same than Lemma 8.
Lemma 10. Let zj and uj , for j ≥ 1, be two infinite se-
quences of points in Rk+ such that zj ≫ zj+1, zj  uj ≻ t,
and limj→∞ zj = t. Then ∃l, l′ such that ul ≻ ul′ .
Proof. First, we assume there exist a point ui such that ui ≫
t. Let δ = min1≤j≤k u
j
i − t > 0. Since limj→∞ zj = t, ∃N
such that ∀i ≥ N one has ||zi − t||∞ = max1≤j≤k z
j
i − t
j ≤
δ/2. We have uji ≥ t + δ > t + δ/2 ≥ z
j
N ≥ u
j
N , meaning
that ui ≻ uN .
Now assume that ∀i, ui 6≫ t. Since ui ≻ t, it means that ∃αi
such that uαii = t
αi . Without loss of generality by considering
an (infinite) subsequence of ui we can assume that ∀i, αi = 1.
Again by considering an (infinite) subsequencewe can assume
that ∃K with 1 ≤ K ≤ k − 1 such that ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ K , one
has uji = t
j , and ∀j, K + 1 ≤ j ≤ k, one has uji > t
j . Now
we can apply the same line of reasoning than in the first case,
by considering only the coordinates betweenK+1 and k.
Theorem 3. The Pareto mechanismM gives all the equilibria
truthful payments.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We assume that the pay-
ment is computed in a different way than in our Pareto mecha-
nism, and we show that there exists a configuration for which
an agent has an incentive to lie. We consider any agent i, and
any vector bi such that bi ∈MAX(b−i, bi).
Let first assume that the payment computed π(bi) is incompa-
rable with the set of points T (B \{bi}), i.e. ∀t ∈ T (B \{bi})
one has π(bi) ∼ t. Using Lemma 8, there exists δ ≫ ~0 such
that ∀t ∈ T (B \ {bi}), π(bi)+ δ ∼ t. Let us assume that vi =
π(bi)+δ. Since ∀t ∈ T (B\{bi}), vi ∼ t, we know by Defini-
tion 5 that vi 6∈MAX(b−i, vi) or vi ∈MAX(B\{bi}). One
cannot have vi ∈ MAX(B \ {bi}), because Lemma 5 would
contradict the fact that ∀t ∈ T (B \ {bi}), vi ∼ t. Therefore
one has vi 6∈MAX(b−i, vi), and the utility of agent i is ~0 if i
reports her true value vi. If agent i reports bi her utility will be
u′i = vi − π(bi) = δ ≫ ~0, meaning that she has an incentive
to lie. This case is illustrated in the Figure 4 (Case 1).
We assume now that the payment computed π(bi) is domi-
nated by at least one point from T (B \ {bi}). Using Lemma 7
it means that there exists a bipartition T1, T2 of T (B \ {bi})
such that ∀t ∈ T1, t ≻ π(bi) and ∀t ∈ T2, t ∼ π(bi). Using
Lemma 9 there exists δ ≫ ~0 such that ∀t ∈ T (B \ {bi}), t ≻
π(bi)+ δ or t ∼ π(bi)+ δ. Let us assume that vi = π(bi)+ δ.
According to the Definition 5, vi 6∈ MAX(b−i, vi) or vi ∈
MAX(B\{bi}). One cannot have vi ∈MAX(B\{bi}), be-
cause Lemma 5 would contradict the fact that ∀t ∈ T1, t ≻ vi
and ∀t ∈ T2, t ∼ vi. Therefore vi 6∈ MAX(b−i, vi) and the
utility of agent i is ~0 if i reports her true value vi. If agent i re-
ports bi her utility will be u
′
i = vi − π(bi) = δ ≫ ~0, meaning
that she has an incentive to lie. This case is illustrated in the
Figure 4 (Case 2).
We assume now that the payment computed π(bi) strictly
dominates at least one point t from T (B\{bi}). Now there are
two cases to consider, either π(π(bi)) 6= π(bi) or π(π(bi)) =
π(bi). If π(π(bi)) 6= π(bi), by using (1) one has π(bi) ≻
π(π(bi)). If we assume that vi = bi then agent i would have
an incentive to report π(bi) instead of her true value bi. In-
deed, since π(bi) ≫ t, one can conlude from Definition 5
that π(bi) ∈MAX(b−i, π(bi)). Moreover, agent i would pay
π(π(bi)) instead of π(bi). This case is illustrated in the Fig-
ure 4 (Case 3). Assume now that π(π(bi)) = π(bi). Consider
any vector b′i such that π(bi) ≻ b
′
i and b
′
i ∈ MAX(b−i, b
′
i).
For example, one can take b′i = π(bi) − (π(bi) − t)/2 (since
π(bi) ≫ t, one has b′i ≫ t and hence by Definition 5 one has
b′i ∈MAX(b−i, b
′
i)). Using Lemma 4, either π(b
′
i) is incom-
parable with π(π(bi)) = π(bi), or π(b
′
i) = π(π(bi)) = π(bi).
If π(b′i) ∼ π(bi) then by using Lemma 6 with x = b
′
i,
y = π(bi) and z = π(b
′
i), one has b
′
i 6 π(b
′
i). However
this contradict the assumption that b′i  π(b
′
i) (see (1)). If
π(b′i) = π(bi) then since π(bi) ≻ b
′
i, we have π(b
′
i) ≻ b
′
i, and
there is again a contradiction with the assumption (1). This
case is illustrated in the Figure 4 (Case 4).
According to the previous discussion, the only remaining
case we need to consider is when π(bi) dominates, but not
strictly dominates, at least one point from T (B \ {bi}). Since
bi ∈MAX(b−i, bi) (and bi 6∈MAX(B \ {bi})) we know by
Definition 5 that ∃t′ ∈ T (B \ {bi}) such that bi ≫ t′. We are
going to consider a set of vectors bi,l, with l ≥ 1, such that
∀l ≥ 1, bi,l ≫ bi,l+1, bi,l ≫ t′ and liml→∞ bi,l = t′. Since
T (B \ {bi}) has a finite number of elements, we can assume
without loss of generality that all the vectors π(bi,l) dominates
the same point t ∈ T (B \ {bi}). Recall also that, by inequal-
ity (1), bi,l  π(b−i, bi,l) = π(bi,l). One can easily see that
necessarily t = t′. Now using Lemma 10 we obtain that, ∃l, l′
such that π(bi,l) ≻ π(bi,l′). If we assume that vi = bi,l then
agent i would have an incentive to report bi,l′ instead of her
true value bi,l.
6 A Pareto mechanism for the Weakly
Maximum Vector problem
We are going to present a Pareto mechanism, denoted byM′,
which satisfies the MIR constraint and which is equilibria-
truthful. For doing so, we modify the mechanism M in or-
der to remove the DV condition. The modified mechanism is
given in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 5. It can be shown
that ∪i∈W bi = WMAX(B).
Algorithm 2 The weakly Pareto mechanismM′.
1: Remove all identical vectors and corresponding agents.
2: For all i ∈ B, set PAY (i) := {t ∈ T (MAX(B) \
{bi}) | bi  t}.
3: W is the set of agents i such that PAY (i) 6= ∅.
4: For all i ∈W choose any pi ∈ PAY (i).
5: For all i /∈W , we set pi = ~0.
b1
b2
b3
b4
bi
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
π(bi)
vi = π(bi) + δ
(a) Case 1
b1
b2
b3
b4
bi
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
π(bi)
vi = π(bi) + δ
T2
T2
T1
(b) Case 2
b1
b3
b2
b4
vi = bi
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
π(bi)
π(π(bi))
(c) Case 3
b1
b3
b2
b4
bi
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
π(π(bi)) = π(bi)
b′i
π(b′i)
(d) Case 4
Figure 4: An illustration of the proof of Theorem 3.
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A Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 2, we first need a lemma.
Lemma 11. Given t ∈ ΩS , one has
(
∀s ∈ S, s 6≫ t
)
⇔(
∀s ∈MAX(S), s 6≫ t
)
.
Proof. (⇒) Obvious since MAX(S) ⊆ S. (⇐) Obvious if
S = MAX(S), so let assume that MAX(S) ⊂ S and let
s ∈ S \MAX(S). By the definition of MAX , there exists
x ∈ MAX(S) such that x  s. Therefore xj ≥ sj for all
j ∈ K . Since x 6≫ t (by hypothesis) there is ℓ ∈ K such that
xℓ ≤ tℓ. We deduce that sℓ ≤ tℓ and s 6≫ t follows.

Proof of Proposition 2:
For any finite set S ⊂ Rk∗+, and any v ∈ R
k
∗+ \MAX(S), we
want to proove the following equivalence:
∃t ∈ T (S) : v ≫ t⇐⇒ v ∈MAX(S ∪ {v}),
with T (S) := MIN({t ∈ ΩS : ∀s ∈ S, s 6≫ t}).
(⇒) Since v ≫ t, vi > ti for all i ∈ K . Since t ∈ T (S), s 6≫
t for all s ∈ MAX(S). It means that for all s ∈ MAX(S)
there exists (at least) one index, says i(s), such that si(s) ≤
ti(s). Then, for all s ∈ MAX(S), si(s) ≤ ti(s) < vi(s)
holds. It follows that s 6≻ v for all s ∈ MAX(S). Thus,
v ∈MAX(S ∪ {v}).
(⇐) v ∈ MAX(S ∪ {v}) means that for all s ∈ MAX(S)
either v ∼ s or v  s. Since v ∈ Rk∗+ \ MAX(S), the
case v  s becomes v ≻ s. Both cases imply that, for all
s ∈ MAX(S), there exists an index, says i(s), such that
vi(s) > si(s). Given a ∈ R∗+, let us denote by decS,j(a)
the quantitymax{x ∈ DjS : x < a}, withD
j
S := {0}∪{s
j :
s ∈ S} for j = 1, . . . , k. Now let us consider a vector
ω satisfying ωi = decS,i(v
i) for all i ∈ K . By defini-
tion of decS,i, one has ω
i(s) ≥ si(s) for all s ∈ MAX(S).
Therefore, s 6≫ ω for all s ∈ MAX(S). We deduce that
ω ∈ {t ∈ ΩS : ∀s ∈ MAX(S), s 6≫ t}. By definition
of a minimum operator MIN , there exists q ∈ MIN({t ∈
ΩS : ∀b ∈ MAX(S), s 6≫ t}) such that q  ω. Us-
ing Lemma 11, the set {t ∈ ΩS : ∀s ∈ MAX(S) s 6≫
t} = {t ∈ ΩS : ∀s ∈ S, s 6≫ t}. By construction,
v ≫ ω holds. Finally, v ≫ ω  q implies v ≫ q where
q ∈MIN({t ∈ ΩS : ∀s ∈ S, s 6≫ t}) = T (S).

For s ∈ Rk∗+ and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, let us de-
fine s(j) as the vector which has its j-th coordinate
equals to sj , and 0 elsewhere. Given a set of vectors
v1, . . . , vn ∈ Rk, let us define VMAX({v1, . . . , vn})
as the vector obtained by taking on each coordinate
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} the maximum value among the j-th co-
ordinate of v1, . . . , vn, i.e. VMAX({v1, . . . , vn}) =
(max1≤i≤n v
1
i , . . . ,max1≤i≤n v
k
i ).
Proposition 5. For any finite set S ⊂ Rk∗+, one has
T (S) = MIN(∪{js∈{1,...,k}|s∈MAX(S)}VMAX(∪s∈MAX(S)s(js))).
Proof. Let us first describe another way to compute the set of
reference points which will be useful to prove some properties
on it. Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} ⊂ Rk∗+, and let us consider a
vector v ∈ Rk∗+ \MAX(S) such that v ∈ MAX(S ∪ {v}).
Of course v 6∈ S, and it means that ∀s ∈ S, v is not dominated
by s, i.e. s 6≻ v and s 6= v, i.e. ∃j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, such
that vj > sj . We define a boolean formula ψ indexed by the
vector s, in the following way: ψ(s) := (v ≫ s(1)) ∨ (v ≫
s(2)) ∨ . . . ∨ (v ≫ s(k)). Since we know that v ≫ 0, we get
that v is not dominated by s if and only if the boolean formula
ψ(s) is true. Finally, observe that ∀s ∈ S, v is not dominated
by s, is equivalent with ∀s ∈ MAX(S), v is not dominated
by s. Therefore, one has v ∈ MAX(S ∪ {v}) if and only if
ψ :=
∧
s∈MAX(S) ψ(s) is true, i.e.
ψ :=
∧
s∈MAX(S)
[(v ≫ s(1))∨(v ≫ s(2))∨ . . .∨(v ≫ s(k))]
is true.
We can rewrite ψ as
ψ :=
∨
{js∈{1,...,k}|s∈MAX(S)}
∧
s∈MAX(S)
(v ≫ s(js)).
In this formula, the∨ is taken over all tuples (js)s∈MAX(S),
with js ∈ {1, . . . , k} for each s ∈ MAX(S), there are there-
fore k|Pmax(S)| such tuples.
Clearly, one has
∧
s∈MAX(S)(v ≫ s(js)) ⇐⇒ v ≫
VMAX(∪s∈MAX(S)s(js)), therefore we can write
ψ :=
∨
{js∈{1,...,k}|s∈MAX(S)}
(v ≫ VMAX(∪s∈MAX(S)s(js))).
Now observe that if v1 ≻ v2, clearly one has v ≫ v2 if and
only if (v ≫ v1) ∨ (v ≫ v2). We therefore have proved the
proposition.

Proof of Lemma 2 and 3:
It is a direct consequence of Proposition 5.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Let s ∈ MAX(S). Then ∀s′ ∈ MAX(S), s′ 6= s,
∃ls′ , 1 ≤ ls′ ≤ k, such that (s
′)ls′ < sls′ . If we take
js′ = ls′ for s
′ 6= s, and js any integer value between 1
and k, we have ∀s′ ∈ MAX(S), s ≻ s′(js′ ), and therefore
s ≻ VMAX(∪s′∈MAX(S)s
′(js′)). The result now follows
from Proposition 5.

